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When submarine cables cut, who keeps running?

West African submarine cable cuts have caused multi-country outages with hours-to-days of impact. We use these incidents to pressure-test our customers' resilience designs, and most fail.

2 Feb 20264 min read

West Africa has seen multiple high-profile submarine cable incidents in recent years, most notably the 14 March 2024 quad-cable incident off Côte d'Ivoire (WACS, MainOne, SAT-3, and ACE all severed in a suspected undersea avalanche), which knocked out international connectivity across 13 African countries for hours and, for MainOne in particular, weeks of degraded capacity. These events are not 'black swans'; they are foreseeable disruptions in a system with concentrated international capacity routes.

What we see when we do the post-incident audit

  • Customers nominally on 'redundant' international links discovering that both providers ride the same physical cable.
  • Failover paths that are theoretically present but never tested in production conditions.
  • Bandwidth-management policies that don't degrade gracefully, entire applications go down rather than throttling cleanly.
  • Voice and collaboration services routed in ways the customer didn't realise depended on international transit.

The real resilience checklist

  • Two independent international transit providers, on physically diverse cables.
  • A LEO satellite path (Starlink today, Kuiper soon) as a third, fully-independent leg.
  • Application-aware degradation policies, keep VoIP up even when the bulk-transfer queue gets shed.
  • Quarterly real failover tests, not paper exercises.
  • An incident-response runbook that names humans, not just tools.
What this means for you

If you can't say with confidence which physical cables your traffic rides today, you don't have a redundancy story, you have a redundancy diagram. We audit this for clients before we propose any rearchitecture.

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